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Introduction: Two European Nations 
in Search of Participatory Democracy 
During the last three years, we were witnessing the breakdown of bureau-
cratic socialism and mostly successful revolutions in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Yet, the burdens of the past still have a strong impact in all 
spheres of life, most visibly in the economy and in the natural environment. 
Mill ions arc troubled by loosing their jobs and by increased social inse-
curity. There is a lack of normative orientation and positive life perspec-
tives. Many creative forces in science and culture need to be revitalized. 
Last not least, the liberated nations have to (re)build democratic structures 
in politics and society. 
Western market economy and pluralist democracy serve as widely ac-
cepted models for the renewal of the formerly socialist systems. The coun-
tries of Western Europe appear indeed to be superior in most regards. But 
the defeat of bureaucratic socialism is not the final victory of today's capi-
talism. We should not underestimate the structural shortcomings of capi-
talist democracies, their economic, social and ecological problems. Most 
Western societies have not yet overcome e.g. mass unemployment, housing 
shortages, inadequate care for children and elderly people, the drug prob-
lem, or widespread political apathy. And there are universal problems re-
presenting old and new challenges for modern democracies: how can we 
avoid total bureaucratization, underdevelopment or a global ecological ca-
tastrophe? We urgently need to increase the capability of systems and indi-
viduals to meet these challenges in a non-authoritarian way. Therefore, in 
East and West, the growth of participatory democracy, more popular inter-
est in public affairs and a democratic political culture arc necessary lo solve 
those problems and to preserve freedom, whether achieved more recently 
or decades ago. 
My g e n e r a l hypothesis is: The present historical situation is characterized 
by a growing need for political participation. Though conditions arc quite 
different all over the world, this need is similarly articulated: 
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- as a personal quest for freedom, as a basis and element of individual 
self-realization; 
- as the claim of informal or formally organized groups of citizens for au-
tonomy, pluralism and an increased share of power in public life; 
- as a normative and actually working principle to render democratic le-
gitimacy to the political decision-making process; 
- as a functional prerequisite for economic growth and modernization, 
for labor efficiency and technological innovation; 
- as a goal and as a means that is necessary for efficient reforms in all 
policy areas, in "normal" times as well as in situations of systemic or secto-
ral crisis. 
Of course, the demand for popular political participation is not new, and 
there were always good reasons for it: 
"From Aristotle to John Dewey, political philosophers have extolled 
popular participation as a source of vitality and creative energy, as a 
defense against tyranny, and as a means of enacting the collective wisdom. 
By involving the many in the affairs of the state, participation should pro-
mote stability and order; and by giving everyone the opportunity to express 
his own interests, it should secure the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber. The community should gain, furthermore, by drawing upon the talents 
and skills of the largest possible number of people. Some philosophers 
have claimed, in addition, that participation benefits like participants as 
well as the larger community. It ennobles men by giving them a sense of their 
own dignity and value, alerts both rulers and ruled to their duties and responsi-
bilities, and broadens political understanding." (McClosky 1967, p. 252) 
In Eastern and Western Europe, the democratic revolutions of the last 
two centuries may differ in their achievements - but they arc all unfinished. 
The extension of political participation, the democratization of all spheres 
of social life arc still on the agenda. In this volume, we will focus on the 
political system and the political culture of two major Central European 
countries: Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 80s. There 
arc striking differences, but there are also many similarities in the condi-
tions and prospects of freedom and democracy, both in the past and 
presence of these unequal neighbours. Most studies refer to developments 
that took place till the end of 1989, i.e. before a united Germany was cre-
ated. They want to contribute to our understanding of both nations' experi-
ences, problems and potentials for a democratic transformation of indus-
trial societies in Europe. 
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Potentials of the Past 
The history of European democracies was characterized by the steady 
growth, sometimes at a revolutionary pace, of popular participation: from 
constitutional monarchy to parliamentary democracies; from the hidden in-
fluence of the few to universal suffrage, public debates, and organized plu-
ralism; from the privileges of the aristocracy to the active public involve-
ment of millions of citizens in parties, trade unions, factory councils, in 
public and private organizations. In this century, we saw many successes 
and failures of European nations striving for stable democracies. They 
wanted to follow the ideals and principles of liberal and socialist demo-
cracy, but they also had to learn that the reality of Stalinism or facism 
proved to be the contrary. Nevertheless, the liberal model, based on human 
rights, the rule of law and political pluralism, finally prevailed at the end of 
the 80s. After 1945, Poland and Germany went very different ways in their 
effort for establishing or improving democracy. 
In Poland, the ruling Communist Party (PUWP) asserted to establish 
and to develop socialist democracy, based on the collective ownership of 
the industrial means of production, on guaranteed human rights, and on 
mass participation in all spheres of social life. In reality, these claims 
proved to be widely untrue in the view of most citizens. The nation had to 
adapt to communist rule. It tried to find a livable "Polish way to socialism" 
under Soviet hegemony, always keeping its strong sense for "real" demo-
cracy. Especially after 1970, the Polish political class was not as repressive 
as most of their socialist relatives (including the G D R ) . It had to give some 
leeway to the opposition, to intellectuals, artists and workers (or it deliber-
ately refrained from light controls). Civi l rights and individual freedom, 
esp. the freedom of opinion, the right to protest and to organize against the 
ruling elite arc longstanding demands of the Polish working class and the 
intellectuals. The ability of small groups to gain some autonomy for politi-
cal action (even illegally or on a semi-legal basis) to realize solidarity in 
various forms are traditional features of Polish political culture. (For a 
more detailed account, see the previous volume G. Meyer/F. Ryszka: Die 
polilische Kultur Polens. Tubingen 1989.) Mass protest and proposals for 
democratic political reforms, so that people would have a larger say in the 
factory and in politics, were important elements of public discussion and 
conflict in all crises and reform periods since 1956. The historical break-
through of "Solidarity" (in 1980/81, and finally since 1989), and the sweep-
ing reform of political institutions, agreed upon at the Round Table in 1989 
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and headed by T. Mazowiecki, L. Walesa and B. Geremek, were the most 
visible expressions of the process of democratization in Poland. In compari-
son lo most other socialist systems, this process started very early and 
seems to be rather successful. But its rapid progress and the hope for stable 
democracy should not mislead us in underestimating the impact of authori-
tarian traditions, the dangers of deeply rooted political alienation and of 
widespread apathy. "The authoritarian temptation" always existed in recent 
Polish history, and it seems still to be true for a large part of the popula-
tion. Not only in Poland a long learning process why and how to get actively 
involved in public affairs is lying ahead for the average citizen. 
In West Germany the heritage of the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic 
and, most important, of fascism, was a heavy burden for the new democracy 
finally established by the Grundgesetz in 1949. In its early years, this 
"democracy without democrats", as some critics put it pointedly, was pri-
marily based on democratic procedures and institutions. A democratic pol-
itical culture developed only gradually. (For a more detailed account see 
e.g. P. Reichel: Politische Kultur der B R D , Opladen 1981.) In Germany, 
participation was always an important norm for political behaviour, as 
demonstrated e.g. by high voting turnouts in national elections. But the de-
mand for a "democratization of all spheres of social life" only emerged in 
the wake of the student revolt in the late 60s. Its democratic ideas and ra-
tional demands, new models and experiments in social and cultural life, the 
experience of revolt, of mass demonstrations, and of "grass roots demo-
cracy" had a strong impact on public life in the reform era of the 70s. It 
started in 1970 with the formation of a coalition government between So-
cial Democrats and Liberals under chancellor Willy Brandt. "Daring more 
democracy" was one of his goals. The following "participatory revolution" 
(Kaase/Barnes) saw a significant increase in political activity - e.g. in politi-
cal parlies, in "citizens' initiatives" (Bürgerinitiativen), or in the "new social 
movements" (e.g. anti-nuclear, women's lib, peace, ecology, Third World). 
In the 80s, innovative ideas for more effective political participation were 
brought in by a new party, the Greens. It originated from a growing discon-
tent with (or even alienation from) the "established parties" and their re-
presentatives. The Greens attacked their policies and political style. They 
articulated the neglect of basic issues and of popular concerns in the field 
of ecology. As a "movement parly" (Bewegungspartei), the Greens also en-
compassed the positive experience of mostly young people in the civic 
movements, looking for new ways of action and personal relations in poli-
tics. The programs and policies of the other parties reflected as well the 
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change of values that took place in the 70s and 80s: political participation, 
a larger say for the individual in all social arenas, became an important 
goal, especially for well ecucated people. This attitude corresponded with 
the traditional demand and established practice of (more) "co-determina-
tion" (Mitbestimmung) in the factory, as put forward by the trade unions. 
But in the history of the F R G , there also existed strong authoritarian, con-
servative and liberal political forces and social groups that opposed vigor-
ously the idea of a democratization of all spheres of social life. In their 
view, democracy should be limited to the political realm. They thought it 
should not and it cannot be fully applied in the economy, and only to a very 
limited degree in public institutions, e.g. in schools, universities, hospitals, 
or churches. Thus, in the F R G , there is no general consensus how far par-
ticipation and democratization should go. The basicly hierarchical structure 
of most institutions and organisations, the interests of state bureaucrats, 
and the power of economic elites put severe limitations on popular partici-
pation in this capitalist democracy. The West German political culture is 
characterized by a pluralism of traditions, theoretical positions and actual 
practices of political participation on the various levels of its political sys-
tem. For many, a more active role and more personal influence, both at the 
workplace and in politics, remain important goals to be achieved. 
Before we can go on describing and explaining some major trends and 
problems of political participation in Poland and West Germany, we have 
to clarify our key concepts of political participation and democratization. 
And, we also have to discuss some theoretical and methodological ques-
tions of a parallel analysis of these two strongly differing political systems. 
The Concept or Political Participation 
In this book, the term "political participation" will be used in a broad sense. 
It refers to all voluntary activities by which individuals or groups want to in-
fluence the selection of rulers and representatives and/or the making and 
outcome of public policies. These activities arc based on individual predis-
positions (e.g. needs, motives, perceptions, values) and resources (e.g. lime, 
education). They arc important preconditions and variables for the size 
and quality of political participation. Effective political participation, or at 
least the opportunity for it, is an essential part of democracy. To enhance 
political participation is a major objective in the democratization of a 
polity or society. For the comparison of authoritarian systems, e.g. of the 
formerly socialist systems of Central and Eastern Europe, and democratic 
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systems, as they developed in many Western European countries and (now 
also in the East), it is important to distinct between p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
m o b i l i z a t i o n , a p a t h y a n d c o m p l i a n c e . 
Political participation is based primarily 
- on voluntary activities, 
- on a certain degree of individual or group autonomy and equal legal 
opportunities to become politically active and make political choices, 
- on a minimum of chances to wield public influence, guaranteed by formal 
rules and institutions, and by a certain degree of responsiveness of the 
political elite. 
Political participation is not just a symbolic, ritual or token activity that 
is designed to merely support a given political order or the interests of a 
political elite that docs not allow political opposition and regular tests of 
its democratic legitimacy. 
If the involuntary character, the fear of negative sanctions, and the press-
ure for acclamation prevail in political activities, if the power elite is defin-
ing the scope and content of political activities, "organizing the masses 
from above", we should rather speak of political mobilization. It is not al-
ways easy to make clear cut distinctions. In most states, we find a mixture 
between elements of political participation "from below" and political mo-
bilization "from above". But there arc substantial differences not to be 
blurred between the two types of mass political activities e.g. in Poland 
under Gierek or Jaruzelski on one hand, and the time after the Round 
Table in 1989 or in comparison with West Germany in the 70s and 80s, on 
the other hand. 
In both systems, we find public activities of individuals that are best charac-
terized as political compliance. In this case, citizens obey or follow norms of 
political behaviour that are defined in laws, institutional rules, or in decisions 
by powerful political bodies, e.g. the party or the secret police. They usually 
go with the threat of severe negative sanctions in case or, non-compliance. 
In both systems we also find political apathy,either as an expression of in-
difference ("I dont't care for politics"), or of a low sense of efficacy, of a 
feeling of alienation or of political privatism. Politically passive citizens, 
though, may follow this pattern on grounds of deliberate criticism and refu-
sal of the political system. The articles of K. Jasiewiez and H . - G - Wehling 
present motives and patterns of non-voting in both countries as an express-
ion of apathy, alienation or conscious non-interference. 
Political scientists differ strongly on the question: What is political? 
Where is the borderline between political and "non-political" participa-
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tion? There is no clear borderline in reality. In most Western studies, for 
analytic purposes or as a matter of convenience, political acts arc defined as 
those which are conceived or directed towards political goals to be achieved 
by the various decision-making units of the political system. In the case of 
socialist systems, e.g. in Poland after 1947, such a distinetion is hardly feas-
ible, as is clearly demonstrated in M. Marody's article. Most areas of social 
life were, directly or indirectly, at least influenced, if not determined by pol-
itical decisions. Hence, most Polish citizens include the state of economic 
affairs, social policies, and individual living conditions in the notion of what 
is political. In Poland, until 1989, nearly all public activities implied politi-
cal purposes or consequences. Social life, in most of its dimensions, was a 
"res publica" and treated as a public affair. Polish society regards herself as 
a civil and moral society, apart from the domains of "politics" which was 
mostly conceived as "what the authorities do". In any case, we will have to 
look at different perceptions of social, economic and political life, and at 
the different ways how activities in economic, social and cultural life arc re-
lated to the political system. (Therefore, we included e.g. studies on indus-
trial and work relations in both countries, or on "social self-help groups" in 
Germany, in this volume.) 
Political participation is embedded in the political culture of a society. 
Thus, political participation belongs to the subjective dimension of politics 
as well as to the "objective" structures of the polity and its political process. 
In contrast to most specialists in the field, I would not refrain the concept 
of political participation to actual political behaviour. I would rather in-
clude the psychic and cognitive bases of participation, i.e. the citizens' per-
ception of and their attitude towards political participation. Political inter-
est and motivation, political resources and values of individuals arc import-
ant factors for their readiness, ability and availability for political participa-
tion. M. Marody's article is a fine example for the significance of people's 
perceptions for their potential political behaviour. 
A Typology of Participatory Activities 
Any empirical analysis of political participation starts with a typology and a 
selection of specific types of political activities. Max Kaase's (1987) typo-
logy of individual acts of political participation seems to be most suitable 
for our purposes. It includes four heuristic dimensions: 
1. constitutional vs. non-institutional ("verfasst vs. nicht verfasst"). Par-
ticipation can be based on constitutional norms, laws or similar rules that 
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formally define the conditions and consequences of an act of participation, 
e.g. voting. On the contrary, there arc activities that arc allowed by, but not 
explicitly incorporated in the constitution; or, they may be not formally in-
stitutionalized, e.g. activities of "citizens' initiatives" or "social movements" 
against nuclear power plants, or as shown by F. Vilmar/B. Runge, the acti-
vities of autonomous groups for social "self-help". 
2. legal vs. illegal. This obvious difference between political activities is 
not only important in practical politics. In its definitions, it may vary be-
tween political systems as well as over time, or in the patterns of law en-
forcement. Correspondingey, a further distinction can be made between 
civil disobedience and agressive political violence. 
3. legitimate vs. illegitimate. In contrast to the "objective" definition of 
legality, this dimension refers to the "subjective" assessment of political acts 
by citizens or collective political actors. This is a significant aspect of both 
public controversy and political change. 
4. conventional vs. non-conventional. Conventional acts of participation 
are related to institutional elements of the political process with a high de-
gree of legitimacy, conventional and unconventional ones aim at direct in-
fluence on political decisions with a low degree of legitimacy. There are 
both legal and illegal forms of unconventional participation, e.g. voting, 
campaigning, acting in a city's council, collecting signatures for a resolu-
tion, citizens' initiatives, Iegal demonstrations and boycotts as opposed 
against "wild strikes", lax boycotts, traffic interruptions or the occupation of 
buildings. A further distinetion can be made between violence against per-
sons and against property. 
In this volume, we will deal with nearly all forms of political participa-
tion, from voting to activities in self-help groups, trade unions, political 
parties and workers' self-administration. We will look both into patterns of 
behaviour as shown by professional "gladiators" or political elites, by occa-
sional "activists", by "spectators" (who seek information and vote), or by 
"apathetics" who just watch the political process. There arc certainly vari-
ous degrees in the intensity of a person's political involvement. On first 
sight, they seem to follow a hierarchy, from "easy" to "more advanced or de-
manding" forms of action, according to the resources (time, effort, risks, 
money, prestige) that have to be invested. After many years of debate in 
political science, it turned out that there is not a one-dimensional conti-
nuum of political participation, neither for conventional nor for unconven-
tional participation (cf. Kaase 1981.) 
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Dimensions or Democratization 
A democratic political culture cannot grow without an increase in the size 
and efficiency of political participation. This is strongly determined by the 
degree of democratization or the democratic opportunities to wield politi-
cal influence, as offered by the political system. In general, democratization 
means to reduce or to eliminate obstacles in the power structure of a so-
ciety which hinder people to satisfy legitimate individual or collective 
needs. Democratization is understood b o t h as a g o a l a n d as a process. More 
specificly, in the political sphere, democratization means to back or to dis-
mantle illegitimate political power, often based on socio-economic privi-
leges, in favor of individuals or groups hitherto underprivileged. To guaran-
tee individual human rights is an essential part of this process. If we look at 
the conditions for a democratic political culture, democratization encom-
passes 
1. the reduction of socio-economic and educational inequalities, e.g in 
general education, in professional qualification or in the quality of labor, 
that make for incqual opportunities to become active and influential in 
politics; 
2. more equality in the rights, resources and opportunities of citizens to 
participate and to exert influence in the political process, to control politi-
cal elites and institutions; 
3. the growth of attitudes and motivations to participate in politics; 
4. a process of political socialization and public media that provide ade-
quate informations, capabilities, and skills for mass political participation. 
So, if a democratic revolution wants to be successful, not only constitutional, 
legal and political changes have to be accomplished, but also socio-eco-
nomic, psychological and cultural ones. 
Democratization can lake place in t h r e e m a j o r f o r m s (ef. Vilmar 1973, 
vol. I, pp. 162/163): 
1. as limited and non - binding participation in the political decision-
making-process by the right to be informed, to consult or to be consulted, 
to vote or to protest. 
2. restrictions on the decision-making power of ruling elites or institu-
tions by the right to propose, to control, to consent (including quote or ma-
jority rules) or to refuse compliance (obligatory or binding participation); 
3. the dissolution or abolition of the decision-making power of ruling 
elites or institutions, shifted to or acquired by other political actors. This 
can be accomplished by legal, peaceful, spontaneous or revolutionary acts, 
16 G e r d M e y e r 
by informal self-organization, nationalization or the gradual phasing out of 
a political system. 
Today, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l system i n the f o r -
m e r l y s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s of Central and Eastern Europe means, above all, 
the introduction of basic structures of liberal democracy, i.e. primarily: 
1. the guarantee of basic human rights, esp. the freedom of information 
and opinion, to assemble and to organize particular interests; 
2. the rule of law, an independent judiciary, possibly administrative and 
constitutional courts; 
3. organized social and political pluralist , a multi-party system, free elec-
tions, guaranteed rights for political opposition and for minorities; 
4. the extension of popular participation in political, social, economic, edu-
cational and cultural institutions (e.g. the recruitment of leaders by elec-
tion, democracy within political parties, co-determination of workers 
and employees in enterprises; popular plebiscite; a growing autonomy of 
private organizations, e.g. interest groups, "citizens' initiatives" and 
"social movements"; 
5. maximum control and internal restrictions of the political executive (go-
vernment, stale buraucracy, secret police, army, prosecutors) and econo-
mic state monopolies: 
- by strong parliaments on all levels of the political system; 
- b y independent critical mass media ("glasnost") and public debates on 
policy alternatives; 
- by the division of powers in the state ("checks and balances"); 
- by free scientific research and discussion, artistic expression and cultural 
creativity; 
- by decentralization and regional autonomy, possibly federalism; by 
local self-administration. 
6. the abolition of an official stale ideology, claimed to be valid for all citi-
zens ("open society"). 
These were and arc main elements of democratizaion in modern indus-
trial societies. In most regards, West Euroean - states are historically well 
ahead. In general, this is also true comparing West Germany and Poland 
after 1949. But if we take a close look at all dimensions of democratization, 
at the. socio-economic, cultural and psychological conditions of political 
participation today, it is no longer possible to pass quick and simple judge-
meats. This is especially true, if we do not only ask for the present state, but 
also for the relative historical progress each society has made under very 
different systemic and international circumstances. This rises both the 
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question of historical relativity, and even more of legitimate and adequate 
comparisons. 
Polish-German cooperation: approaches to cross-national 
analysis 
Since 1986, political scientists and sociologists from the University of Tubin-
gen, the University and the Academy of Sciences in Warszaw organized five 
conferences to study the political culture, political participation and the 
process of democratization in both countries. We started with separate 
studies to understand these phenomena in their historical and national 
context. Two volumes were published containing more than 40 empirical, 
interpretative and theoretical studies on the political culture of Poland and 
West Germany in the 80s (ef. Meyer/Ryszka 1989, Ryszka/Meyer 1990). 
Once and again during the first three conferences, spontaneous ques-
tions and remarks popped up comparing both societies, showing different 
backgrounds of experience, understanding and judgement of the partici-
pants. To be sure, astonishment or critical tones were not missing in our 
discussions. Today, not only the relative achievements and failures in both 
countries, but even more the perspectives of a united Europe, of capitalist 
and post-socialist democracies made us ask: what is the state of political 
participation and democratization in Poland and West Germany? Can we 
compare at all these unequal partners of the 80s? 
This volume contains our contributions to a parallel and exemplary, if 
not truly comparative analysis of some central aspects of the subject. Most 
articles were presented at two Polish-German conferences in Weingarten 
(West Germany, sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation) in 19S8 and in 
Krakow in 19S9. 
Stefan Nowak, the well known Polish sociologist who died in 1989, look 
part in two of our earlier conferences. We commemorate his valuable con-
tributions, and the editors feel honored by the fact that we can offer such an 
excellent piece of his theoretical and methodological thoughts on the intri-
cate problems of comparison in the field of social and political values, alti-
tudes and opinions. 
In two earlier papers (in German and Polish), I gave an overview of 
major approaches and methodological problems of comparative studies on 
capitalist and socialist systems in Europe (Meyer 1989, 1990). For the two 
conferences, they served as a basis of discussion and of conceptual clarifica-
tion for a parallel analysis of the two politics. Wc ended up with a very 
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modest program that represents the feasible in the view of the authors: a 
p a r t i a l a n d " p r o b l e m - o r i e n t e d " c o m p a r i s o n o f some i m p o r t a n t aspects a n d exem-
p l a r y f i e l d s o f d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n i n P o l a n d a n d West G e r m a n y u n t i l s p r i n g 1 9 9 0 . 
In political science, there docs not yet exist a comprehensive theory or 
model for a multidimensional and multilevel comparison, or even for a par-
allel systematic and historical analysis, of capitalist and socialist systems. 
There is also no consensus among political sociologists how to carry out 
empirical studies of extremely contrary types of political systems, based on 
widely accepted operational concepts and evaluative standards (cf. Kaase 
1987). Therefore, we were very pragmatic in our approach. We arc touch-
ing many aspects of political participation that, for heuristic purposes and 
better orientation, arc listed here in a compact form. 
Political participation: aspects or cross-national analysis 
1. Structural conditions 
a) Systemic contexts: the political system (politics polity, policies), the 
political culture; class structure and social stratification; regional differen-
ces and historical traditions; fom al and informal structures and oppor-
tunities to participate. 
b) Resources of individuals and groups that determine the scope and effi-
ciency of participation, e.g. time, information, knowledge, education, 
money, status and professional qualifications; differences according e.g. to 
class, gender and age. 
2. Perceptions and attitudes 
a) Prevailing types of perception (cognitive, emotional, evaluative), of 
the political system (esp. the power structure and images of socio-political 
cleavages); of the most important problems and major political actors (e.g. 
parties, trade unions). 
b) Political interest, individual motivation, attitudes and value orienta-
tions concerning political participation and its possible efficiency ("sense of 
efficacy"); the effects of socialization; the use of mass media. 
3. Patterns of behaviour 
Types of participatory activities (e.g. conventional vs. unconventional), 
patterns of actual behaviour; gratifications and sanctions; norms, conform-
ity, and deviance; strategies and tactics; differences according to goals, types 
of problems and situations. 
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4. The dynamics of public interaction 
Various ways how people become active in politics (politizalion, mobili-
zation); informal and institutional activities as part of the dynamics of pub-
lic interaction between citizens, groups, organizations, mass media, politi-
cal institutions and elites; participation in the articulation and aggregation 
of interests; patterns for the resolution of social, cultural, normative, relig-
ious and political c o n f l i c t s ; patterns of general and specific consensus and 
support for the political system ("legitimacy by participation"?). 
5. Scope and effects of political participation 
Opportunities to act and to get access to the decision-making process ac-
cording to goals, problems, resources and types of actors; the constellation 
of political forces and situative factors; patterns of how political power is 
used to influence or to block participatory efforts; effects of participation 
(1) on individuals, groups, institutions etc.; (2) on reforms in certain policy 
areas; (3) on the legitimacy and the (in-) stability of the political system, (4) 
on the progress of democratization. 
In this volume, we want to present a selective overview of major prob-
lems of political participation and democratization in Poland and West 
Germany in the 80s. Sometimes, the Polish and German studies run fairly 
parallel as to their field of inquiry or as to the questions asked, sometimes 
they take divergent approaches. But in any case, they hint at structures and 
problems rather similar in both societies. We fell far from true comparison, 
but, for the attentive reader, it is easy to find out implicit differences or 
common features between these two neighbours experiencing rapid 
changes on their way into the 90s. 
The contents or this volume 
The idea of a parallel and selective analysis of political participation in Po-
land and Germany is realized by the sequence of the articles dealing with 
five major aspects: 
- concepts and methods for cross-national studies (G. Meyer, S. Nowak); 
-general trends in political participation and the question of democratic 
legitimacy ( M . Marody, A. Ryehard; B. Westle, D. Fuchs); 
- the party system, elections and electoral behaviour (St. Gebethner, 
K. Jasiewicz; R.-O. Schultze, H . -G . Wehling); 
- participation, bureaucracy and the welfare state (I. Bialecki; 
R. Prätorius, F. Vilmar/B. Runge); 
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- participation in the factor)' and in the trade unions (R. Bahnmüller/ 
W. Wild , I. Hanke; J. Hausner). 
In this chapter, the reader will find brief sketches of each article. They 
arc not meant to be summaries of these complex studies and their argu-
ments. They should rather give an idea of the author's focus of interest. 
Maybe, they can also serve as an appetizer for further reading. 
According to each author's preference and language skills, the articles 
were written either in English or German (if so, my sketch is a little 
longer). We thought, with English as the lingua franca of the social scien-
ces, we would reach a maximum of readers. My special thanks go to all col-
leagues (esp. from Poland) who renounced to write in their own language 
and who took the burden of translation. Let us now take a closer look at in-
dividual studies. 
Political participation and Democratic Legitimacy 
For M. Marody, a Polish sociologist, political action is not so much a pro-
duct of specific environmental factors, but much more a creative act of the 
individual. It is primarily determined by the way the actor perceives social 
reality, his role and his identity in interacting with the outside world. So, 
she focuses on the subjective dimension of participation, i.e. on individual 
predispositions and perceptions of the "world of politics". M. Marody looks 
at the expectations and mechanisms that determine the citizen's behaviour 
in Poland. She gives both a critical account of past attitudes, of widespread 
alienation from the realm of politics, as well as of emerging pluralist and 
democratic patterns of thinking. 
A. Ryehard directs his attention towards the various problems of the le-
gitimation of the Polish political system in the transition period between 
autumn 198S and early 1990. He asks for the basis on which people accept 
and subordinate themselves to the existing institutional system. The author 
argues that the ancien regime was "based on a mixture of pragmatic adapta-
tion and the possibility of resorting to violence". The new political order 
enjoys much stronger support and democratic legitimacy. But paradoxically 
enough, its main representatives get more support than their reform pro-
grammes (in the past, it was just the other way round). New dangers and 
contradictions arc developing within the "Solidarity"-based order, because 
it is "in a sense suspended in a social, Iegitimational and institutional va-
cuum". 
B. Westle, in a comprehensive study on West Germany, analyzes the 
complex relationship between political participation and political legitim-
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acy. She questions the general judgements on the "crisis of legitimacy" of 
the political system. Based on systematic conceptual differentiations and 
carefully chosen indicators, B. Westle presents abundant empirical data of 
the 80s that arc to be found in the cognitive, affective, and pragmatic orien-
tations in Germany. 
These arc patterns, e.g. of 
- diffuse and specific support; 
- satisfaction with the reality, the policy outputs and the institutions of 
West German democracy, in relation to its ideas and values; 
- (post-)materialist, left/right orientations, party preferences as well as 
socio-demographic factors; 
-attitudes towards (un-)conventional political participation. 
Democratic support and legitimacy of the polity, the political process 
and many policies seem to be rather high in general, but medium or low for 
selected elements, e.g. for politicians, parlies, state interventionism, and 
the opportunities for participation. 
U. Fuchs studies recent trends in the development of unconventional 
political participation and new social movements as innovative forms of 
political activity in Germany. Following in general the typology of political 
participatory activities mentioned above, we observe a continued growth of 
these new forms. Yet, they do not exert a destabilizing stress on the estab-
lished forms of representative parliamentary democracy. They arc rather 
complimentary in character, offering new and broader options for civic par-
ticipation. There is not so much a general discontent with the intermediary 
system in politics, but an increasing acceptance of unconventional political 
behaviour that lends to enhance the integrative capacity and legitimacy of 
the political system. 
The party system, elections and electoral behaviour 
St. Gebethner, a Polish political scientist, studies a central aspect of 
democratization: the formation of a new party system in Poland since 1989. 
In this process, new legal, institutional, and organizational foundations arc 
laid for political participation, overcoming the old hegemonial party sys-
tem. But a recent survey on the attitudes of Poles towards political parties 
and civic movements also shows that there is still widespread mistrust of 
any political party. Probably this is a specific feature of the Polish transi-
tional period to pluralist democracy. 
K. Jasiewiez studies Polish electoral behaviour in the light of surveys on 
his nation's political attitudes which were performed between 1984 and 
22 G e r d M e y e r 
1989. In general, the relatively high acceptance, or reserved acknow-
ledgement, of the authorities and the political status quo in 1984/85 under-
went considerable change since 1988/89, when the opportunity for public 
discussions, and political opposition movements, above all for "Solidarity", 
and for the autonomous organization of interests, increased dramaticly. 
The negative or ritualized attitude towards elections changed, and, in 1989, 
the citizens expressed, mostly in the free elections for the Senate, their radi-
cal refusal of the old system. Aggregate data on the urban/rural dimension 
show that cultural more than structural factors may explain differences in 
the electoral behaviour in the regions. 
R.-O. Schulze gives a comprehensive overview on major trends in the de-
velopment of the West German party system and changes in electoral beha-
viour. Based on a wealth of empirical data, he looks at the dominant pat-
terns of party preferences in national and regional (Länder) elections. 
There was a strong tendency of concentration in the West German party 
sytem, closely related to significant changes in the social structure. The 
author describes and explains the electoral behaviour of major social 
groups and of the heterogeneous young generation. The analysis of the 
consequences of new value orientations and the weaknesses of catch-all 
parties arc further steps to lay ground for eight theses on structural changes 
and the deconcentration of the West German party system, and on the 
corresponding voting behaviour. The author observes tendencies to over-
come or to supplement two traditionally dominant cleavages of the party 
system: 
1. clerical/secular or Catholic/non-Catholic; 
2. positions in favor of market economy and of a low level of state inter-
vention vs. equality and redistribution in a welfare state. 
He emphasizes the development of a new dimension: protection and im-
provement of the natural environment (ecological polity) vs. economic and 
technological growth. 
1I.-G. Wehling deals with an important part of the German electorate: 
the non-voters. He distinguishes unauthentic absentees from those citizens 
who do not vote as a result of incomplete social or political integration or 
as an expression of deliberate protest. In ten theses, he elaborates the ef-
fects of major variables for non-voting: German political culture, institu-
tional levels, social status and integration, images of politics and society. 
The article hints to many dimensions of latent and manifest alienation from 
the political system that are also analyzed in the articles of Westle and 
Fuchs. 
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Participation, bureaucracy, and the welfare stale 
R. Prätor ius raises the question which type of challenges and adaptations 
the traditional structures of the German welfare stale have to undergo as a 
result of changes in the social structure and the political culture. His main 
thesis is (ef. his own summary): The case of the F R G offers a good illustra-
tion for the "social democratic consensus" and its asserted decline (Dahren-
dorf). The core elements of this ideological pattern arc shared not only by 
social-democrats: paternalistic intervention of the welfare state, economic 
growth and technological progress, limited cooperation between labor and 
capital, pluralistic group representation and resolution of social conflicts. 
The recovery of the German welfare state since 1945 was dominated by 
the persistence of bureaucratic routines and corresponding organizational 
segmentation deriving from traditional cleavages and generating routine 
tasks for a reactive social policy. This arrangement was appropriate for a 
political culture that implied "output-expectations" and a passive under-
standing of democratic values. 
The composition dissolved as soon as one of is ingredients changed. The 
"participatory revolution" of the seventies is partly caused by the mismatch 
of organizational and societal structures, partly by a change of values, esp. 
among the young. Traditional milieus and the importance of gainful em-
ployment decrease. Basic provisions of social security arc undispensable. 
But welfare bureaucracies or the trade unions have to change in order to 
meet the requirements caused by an increasing social complexity and the 
strive for more individual autonomy. 
F. Vilmar and B. Runge, in a summary of a larger study on this subject, 
give an outline of the participatory relevance of social self-help groups in 
Germany. They not only give an idea of the scope, size, and some basic 
structures of these groups. Above all, the authors understand them as an 
innovative way of "participator)' learning": people come out of their isola-
tion; they initiate change "from below" in their social environment; they re-
duce alienated work; they contribute to a gradual reform of the welfare 
state - and, last not least, to the growth of a democratic political culture. 
Vilmar and Runge regard these activities of hundreds and thousands of 
F R G citizens as a creative response for the lack of participation as allowed 
by political parties, trade unions and the bureaucratic welfare state. 
I. Bialecki describes a major mechanism how political power and the so-
cial structure were reproduced in Poland till the 80s: the dependence of 
important social groups on the bureaucracies of party and slate, based on 
the nomenklatura system. He describes which occupational groups were in-
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deed, or felt the most dependent on the bureaucracy when asked for their 
fear of loosing jobs and other benefits in 1987. This article outlines some 
socio-economic and psychological mechanisms of bureaucratic rule and 
political adaptation. They worked as major restrictions for criticism, pro-
test and efficient reforms in Poland under Jaruzelski. Objective and subjec-
tive in character, this kind of dependence was (and still is?) an important 
obstacle for the democratization of Polish society. 
Participation in the factory and in the trade unions 
I. Hanke looks at the trade unions and the ways they participate as an or-
ganizational actor in the political process, and which opportunities for par-
ticipation they provide for the individual member. Her article, esp. in an 
appendix with tables and figures, gives an outline of the development of 
major structures and policies of the D G B unions. She briefly describes the 
specific German form of economic co-determination ("Mitbestimmung") in 
enterprises, and its political effects. Since decades, West German trade 
unions have kept their strong position in industrial relations as well as in 
the political system. Yet, in their internal structures, they still arc very 
much a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization. Centralism and disci-
pline arc caused both by external (e.g. neo-corporatist strategies) and inter-
nal factors (e.g. to keep their strike potential high; traditional strategies, 
authoritarianism). But trade unions have to face radical changes in the 
labor force. I. Hanke thinks they should no longer stay too much with de-
fending their traditional clientele. Rather, they should develop better op-
portunities for creative and effective participation inside, and for new nego-
tiating strategies outside. 
R. Bahnmül ler and W. Wild discuss new trends and concepts for the par-
ticipation of workers and employees in enterprises. Radical technological, 
organizational and social changes are taking place in industrial production 
and administration. Better educated, competent and experienced em-
ployees ask for more participation. But they meet a "participatory gap". 
This is increasingly filled by new models of management that aim at in-
creased, but limited participation. Most of them arc presented by their 
management, closely linked to efforts of modernization and rationalization. 
The authors discuss new opportunities and dangers of these profitable inte-
grative strategics. They do not refuse them, they rather take a stand for 
their intelligent use. Paradoxically enough, these changes arc virtually pas-
sing without effective interference from the dual system of organized par-
ticipation, i.e. by the enterprise councils (Betriebsräte) and the trade 
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unions. In the social sciences, the discussions on participation and demo-
cratization in political science and industrial sociology, that have been sep-
arated since the early 70s, should "re-unite", according to the authors. 
J. Hausner correspondingly deals with a semi-public arena that since a 
long time is a main field of political participation in Poland, seeing many 
attempts of democratization: the state and prospects of self-management in 
state enterprises. The author gives a summary of several studies that have 
been carried out in enterprises of the Krakow voivodship between 1983 and 
1987. They dealt with nearly all aspects of participation in this conflict rid-
den arena: the organizational and legal setting, the institutional place of 
self-management bodies in the enterprise's management system; self-man-
agement, the consciousness of the staff, and its effects on the economic per-
formance of the enterprise. The author shows the gap and the many contra-
dictions between official declarations and practices in the past. But he also 
argues that there is a considerable potential for a more democratic, though 
probably "corporate form of management on behalf of the staff, not pri-
marily by the staff. 
Participatory Democracy: Questions in Common 
Inspite of all obvious historical and structural differences, Poland and Ger-
many are two industrialized societies in the heart of Europe which share 
some similar problems in their efforts to establish or to enhance participa-
tory democracy. We will try to give a brief overview on those questions that 
rose in our conferences and that run through many articles of this volume. 
(This superficial sketch of questions to be asked thus serves mainly heuris-
tic purposes, and docs not substitute its empirical study.) 
In both countries, politicians, scientists and educators complain about a 
lack of political participation, both in quantity and quality: "too few govern 
too many", "the many let themselves be directed by the few". First, there is 
the preoccupation with the so-called non-political spheres of life, the pri-
vate and personal well-being. It ranges from the strive for more money, 
consumer goods and better apartments to life in the family, with friends or 
relatives, to enjoy leasure time, TV or cultural events, and, last not least, to 
what you invest in your job, qualification or career. 
Certainly, all these needs and activities serve legitimate individual and 
social interests that dominate everyday life in Europe and elsewhere. So, it 
is actually active participation in politics that needs special motivation (and 
explanation). M. Marody refers to many negative perceptions of politics 
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that hinder individual political participation in Poland. Here, fear and frus-
tration, refusal and resignation, feelings of helplessness and senselessness 
have to be overcome. But there always was (and still is), a strong sense of 
dignity among Polish citizens who refuse just to obey or to be submitted. 
People want to express emotions, opinions and ideas in freedom. This is a 
psychological need as much as a matter of instrumental action. 
But p r i v a t i s m , p o l i t i c a l a p a t h y a n d indifference can also be found in a rich 
liberal society as Germany where an output-orientation toward the state or 
e.g. the trade unions is still strong. Democratic traditions arc not so old in 
the F R G that radical parties on the right (like the "Republikaner"), servile 
compliance in the work place, and intolerance against certain minorities 
would have no chance. Germany has certainly overcome many authorita-
rian traditions of the past, and it has seen a change of values in the gener-
ations that grew up since the early 70s (ef. the articles of Weslle and 
Fuchs). Moral criteria arc not so strong in political judgements than in Po-
land. Religion and the Catholic church play a less important role in Ger-
man society and politics. But there is still a strong sense of duly e.g. in vot-
ing, and people arc not so "tired of politics" as it seems to be the case in Po-
land. Here, there seem to persist quite a number of traditions unfavorable 
to a liberal participator)' democracy : t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m stemming 
from the hierarchical rule of the party, the state and, to a certain degree, of 
the Catholic Church; an attitude "to wail for what you get from the stale", 
or the call for a "strong man" who finishes up with the "whole mess", i.e. 
anomy, economic incfficiccy, corruption etc. 
Obstacles for political participation arc not only formed by subjective 
factors, such as a lack of motivation, opposed personal needs, or a weak 
sense of meaning and efficacy. Very often, there is a l a c k of r e s o u r c e s , dis-
tributed uneven in society. The "standard model" of political participation, 
widely tested in the West, shows a clear advantage for citizens with higher 
education, income and social status, with power and prestige, in urban sett-
lements and "good neighbourhoods". This class bias of political participa-
tion goes along with strong differences in the life styles and perspectives of 
men und women, of the old and the young. The socialist claim that the 
citizen should not only have the constitutional right to participate, but that 
society must also provide the necessary means, has not become obsolete. 
Legal political equality is not enough if there arc very unequal economic, 
social or educational opportunities to participate. 
The tendency that only a rather small number of people is able to partici-
pate effectively in any political decision-making is also very much due to 
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the fact that the number and c o m p l e x i t y of p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s has increased 
enormously. We all have a limited ability and capacity to get and to process 
the necessary amount of information. We have to be highly selective and ef-
ficiency oriented in our attention, in the choice of topics and attendances. 
S p e c i a l i z a t i o n a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n are inevitably growing. 
The complaints about low participation tend to neglect the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s in established capitalist or developing post-
communist democracies. Legal provisions in Poland e.g. were very compli-
cated for the parliamentary elections of 1989. In the F R G , the 5% clause 
prevents all minor parties (and emerging political movements) to enter 
parliaments. Elections arc still a crucial and integral part of democracy. But 
voting is not enough if a stable democracy is to be based on active citizens. 
The spectrum and quality of programs, organizational structures and repre-
sentative elites of political parties must be attractive enough to make 
citizens active beyond elections. 
Many citizens do not feel adequately represented in the political system. 
This is also a result of the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d p o l i c i e s of p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , 
e c o n o m i c , e d u c a t i o n a l a n d c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . In both countries, children 
and students arc not socialized effectively enough to participation. They 
grow up with a lot of pressure for conformity, with mechanisms of pseudo-
democracy, with paternalism and patriarchalism. Double talk towards 
people "above", and subtile pressures to comply, arc still widespread. 
Generally, innerorganizational democracy is generally underdeveloped. 
This is especially true for the socialist or capitalist factory, but it also ap-
plies to the t r a d e u n i o n s (as shown by Hausncr, Bahnmüller/Wild and 
Hanke). Thus, both political socialization and experience on the job still 
too often discourage people to participate and to act in public for their own 
and others' interests. Correspondingly, the trade unions and many other or-
ganizations, which try to organize the interests of "underprivileged" people, 
show a structural weakness in terms of organizational strength, collective 
solidarity and efficient intra-organizational participation, as well as in the 
political arena, leading to an unbalanced social and political pluralism. 
Many efforts to increase political participation do not really care for t y i n g 
p o l i t i c s t o t h e life s i t u a t i o n s of a v e r a g e i n d i v i d u a l s , i.e. to their actual inter-
ests, needs, and emotions, to specific groups and their aspirations, to basic 
needs of housing and for a safe job. Or they do not respond to a growing 
need to be consulted and to have a say in one's own affairs. New forms and 
ways of adressing and activating people arc necesary. 
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In both countries, we find a lot of a l i e n a t i o n f r o m p o l i t i c s i n g e n e r a l , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r f r o m p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n d e n t r e n c h e d p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s (ef. Marody, 
Rychard; Wcslte, Fuchs, Wehling). In Poland, the heavy burdens of the 
past, the heritage of Stalinism and the results of P U W P cadre policy, cor-
ruption and repression, many decades of unkept promises and inefficient 
reforms, and last not least, a desastrous socialist economy and terrible eco-
logical catastrophes have discredited "official politics" and "the authorities" 
for many years. Sure, there were also some politicians and institutions 
trusted and appreciated by the masses. After radical changes in the political 
elites and institutional settings, the establishment of a new party system, of 
fully democratic procedures and effective mass participation arc still on the 
agenda of democratization. Lacking major economic success, the "new pol-
itical order" is by no means enjoying wholehearted popular support, and, 
hence, full democratic legitimacy and stability (ef. the articles of Gebe-
thner, Jasiewicz, Rychard). 
In West G e r m a n y , we can also observe considerable political alienation. 
This is not only true for the "extreme" right and left of the political spec-
trum. It also applies to the center, predominantly as a widespreed feeling of 
being not adequately represented by "the politicians" and their non-rcspon-
sivc, "egoistic" political parties. Since 1985, we watched the rise of a new na-
tionalist Party ("Die Republikaner"), based on latent authoritarianism and 
hostility towards immigrants, combined with a "new nationalism". Feelings 
of general desorientation, social insecurity and diffuse political discontent 
prevail with their voters. This Party successfully mobilized and organized 
this potential until 1989. With German unity and permanent internal strife, 
it had to face its gradual decline. 
At the same time, we observe the decline of the former "new social move-
ments", i.e. the peace, ecology, women's lib, anti-nuclear, third world move-
ments. Their institutionalization within the "Green Party", and their sub-
sequent integration into the political system, led to the decrease of their in-
novative potential, loosing some attractiveness for young voters. In Decem-
ber 1990, the Greens of West Germay in contrast to the coalition of Greens 
and civic movements, called "Bündnis 90" in East Germany, could not win 
enough votes to reenter the Federal Diet. But in the 80s, there is also a re-
markable growth of an autonomous "self-help movement" or network of 
private initiatives (ef. Vilmar/Rungc). Once more, this rises the question of 
the relationship between conventional and non-conventional social and 
political participation. 
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Feelings of political alienation arc created or supported not only by the 
visible political actors, as presented in the mass media: politicians, parties, 
parliaments etc. Even more important is the r u l e of b u r e a u c r a c i e s . Their 
pervading rights and efforts to organize public affairs, and to interfere in 
social life characterizes most modern societies. The rationality and effi-
ciency of burcaucracie, arc certainly necessary ingredients of modernization 
and public welfare. Yet, in socialist Poland, the rule of the cadre bureau-
cracy and its nomenklatura lacked any effective political control by mass 
participation or parliament. It was the essence of Communist party rule to 
transform, to stabilize and to repress society by bureaucratic rule. It nearly 
replaced popular democracy. 
In West Germany, bureaucracies arc much better controlled by parlia-
ments and interest groups, by critical mass media, and by responsible politi-
cians and sensible citizens. But we cannot overlook the fact, that here, too, 
the predominance of state bureaucracies by state interventionism or welfare 
state p a t e r n a l i s m represent a serious threat to participatory democracy. 
Two examples: 
1. Very often the controls of how personal data are used by various pub-
lic and private institutions arc inefficient or incomplete. Thus the capacity 
to control the average citizens enhanced considerably. In turn, this may 
lead to a weakening of certain basic civil rights, and it may strengthen feel-
ings of powerlessness and distrust. 
2. A growing number of citizens who live on welfare ("Sozialhilfeemp-
fänger"), and a nearly constant rate of jobless people (ca. 7-8% or 2 mil-
lions) arc only two indicators that more and more citizens become depend-
ent on the welfare state, its bureaucracies and economic capability. Yet, 
their political loyalty to "the system" and the major political parties is not 
broken, but may get shaky in the future. 
Expectations and demands on the welfare state to take even more re-
sponsibility for comprehensive social security, housing, child and old age 
care etc., as well as changes in the social structure and the political culture, 
i.e. the "participatory revolution of the 70s", put enormous contradictory 
pressures on the welfare slate. At the same time, it should grow, be efficient 
and open up for transparency and participation (ef. Prätorius, Vilmar/ 
Rungc, Bialecki). 
These contradictions arc even deepened by the fact that the e c o l o g i c a l 
p r o b l e m s cry f o r t i g h t state c o n t r o l s - ex ante, as intervention in actu or as 
remedy cx post. But those who arc most outspoken and active about these 
grievances and catastrophes, the ecological movements, at the same time 
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advocate strongly for tougher laws and controls as well as for an antiburc-
aucratic, radical democracy. "Green" and and left critics of the political sys-
tem assert that the structural dominance of private enterprise and a grow-
ing concentration of economic power in a few hands leads to a structural 
neglect of ecological, social and human aspects of production, labor and the 
quality of life. Non-materialist values and criteria of global ethics arc said 
to have no proper place in the decision-making of "big-business", of large 
banks or with their political representatives. Not only Marxists strongly 
criticize the lack of popular influence in politics because of the power and 
dynamics of private capital interests. Ecological problems arc only one 
example to demonstrate that there is a growing pressure and opposition 
that the stare and its bureaucracies gain (have to gain?) more and more 
competences to intervene. 
In order to enhance popular participation many proposals have been 
made how to strengthen parliamentary control and how to give a larger say 
to the ordinary citizen. Many scientists and politicians speak out in favor 
for more d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , r e g i o n a l a u t o n o m y o r f e d e r a l i s m . Thus, the hori-
zontal division of powers would be supported by a vertical redistribution. 
Local government should attain more autonomy and responsibility. New 
elements of plebiscitarían or "direct" democracy, e.g. referenda, could be in-
troduced. Civic movements should be given more rights and better access 
to the decision-making process. To extend the autonomy and the oppor-
tunities of internal democratization for most public institutions (including 
the churches, the military and schools) would enhance both their efficiency 
and their legitimacy. 
A minimum of regular participation is a prerequiste for the democratic 
legitimacy of a political system. A l l other forms of political behaviour (pol-
itical mobilization, compliance, apathy) can at best create mass loyally. 
Consequently, there is a substantial difference between l e g i t i m a c y a n d mass 
l o y a l t y . A political system has gained legitimacy if a majority of the adult 
population believes that 
(1) the system actually realizes, to a satisfying extent, generally accepted, 
"essential or basic values" (such as freedom, equality, democracy, social jus-
tice, economic welfare, social and physical security, rationality, efficiency, 
progress) and/or 
(2) the leadership's actions and the system's functioning (its institutions, 
procedures, norms and sanctions) arc in accordance with the constitution 
and the laws of the country ("due process"), i.e. is not primarily based on 
force, terror or arbitrary decisions by the rulers. 
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So, the concept of legitimacy may be "value oriented or material" and/or 
"process oriented or legal" in character. Legitimacy is based on positive 
convictions or the identification of a majority of citizens with the system's 
main goals, supported by acts of political participation. In contrast, the no-
tion of mass loyalty implies no claim for a positive belief in the legitimate 
or "just" character of the system. Mass loyalty is achieved when there is ac-
tual compliance and a minimum of cooperation of the vast majority of 
citizens "with the power", with the rulers and their rules. The functional re-
quirements for the working of the economy and the public institutions are 
fulfilled, regardless of the motivation. The motives may be: "you can't do 
anything against the system"; "you have to learn the qualify and to work 
in order to survive"; "it is the lesser evil to do what 'they' ask for and to 
avoid any trouble"; "it doesn't matter to me" etc. Mass loyalty only requires 
a minimum level of activity by the citizens, so that the political system is 
able to function on a satisfying level, not necessarily democratic in character. 
After decades of authoritarian communist rule, new political institutions 
and democratic procedures had to be established in Poland to give demo-
cratic legitimacy to the protagonists and negotiators for peaceful change, 
for the new political elites and institutions, and, last not least, for risky and 
radical reforms. Many of the formerly socialist countries bring a very spe-
cial experience to European political culture: the r o u n d t a b l e s . In Poland, in 
19S0/S1 and in 1989, negotiations for a broad national understanding to 
solve heavy social and political conflicts look place. Very early, negotiating, 
dialogue, and de facto compromises were characlerie for the political cul-
ture and reform politics in Poland. In the G D R , in a different political set-
ting, the round tables, on many political levels and in many spheres of pub-
lie life, for some months became important institutions for reform, sta-
bility, and a very cooperative approach to transform the socialist system. It 
remains to be seen whether these patterns of cooperation beyond the ma-
jority principle will bring a new spirit or new patterns of conflict resolution 
into the political culture of Central Europe. 
In some Western European countries, where cooperative strategics of 
trade unions prevail, n e o - c o r p o r a t i s t s t r u c t u r e s serve to coordinate policies 
and strategics for economic crisis management between state, entrepre-
neurs and trade unions. The F R G presents a good example of a higly co-
operative approach to manage confias between "social partners" in a "so-
cial market economy". In the future, .he similar functioning of some EC or 
UN organs may be as important for the reduction of social and political 
conflicts by international cooperation and high-level diplomacy. Because of 
